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Abstract. National disasters can threaten national security and require
several organizations to integrate the functionalities to correspond to the
event. Many countries are constructing a nationwide mobile communi-
cation network infrastructure to share information and promptly com-
municate with corresponding organizations. Public Safety Long-Term
Evolution (PS-LTE) is a communication mechanism adopted in many
countries to achieve such a purpose. Organizations can increase the ef-
ficiency of public protection and disaster relief (PPDR) operations by
securely connecting the services run on their legacy networks to the PS-
LTE infrastructure. This environment allows the organizations to con-
tinue facilitating the information and system functionalities provided by
the legacy network. The vulnerabilities in the environment, which differ
from commercial LTE, need to be resolved to connect the network se-
curely. In this study, we propose a security model design framework to
derive the system architecture and security requirements targeting the re-
stricted environment applied by some technologies for a specific purpose.
After analyzing the characteristics of the PPDR operation environment
under the PS-LTE infrastructure, we applied the framework to derive
the security model for organizations using PPDR services operated in
their legacy network through this infrastructure. Although the proposed
security model design framework is applied to the specific circumstance
in this research, it can be generally adopted for the application environ-
ment.
Keywords: PS-LTE · Public Protection and Disaster Relief (PPDR) ·
Security Model Design Framework · Security Threat Analysis; Security
Requirement · System Architecture
1 Introduction
Advances in mobile communication technologies enrich civilians’ lives and en-
hance the operational efficiency for public protection and disaster relief (PPDR).
The technologies connect agents from fields and command posts to increase
their field functionality. Besides, response agencies can enhance their mutual
co-operation by exchanging information over a shared communication channel.
Many countries have constructed mobile communication network infrastruc-
tures for PPDR. However, cutting-edge mobile communication technologies have
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rarely been adopted as a communication mechanism. Instead, some functionali-
ties required for PPDR are added to the technologies whose reliability and safety
are guaranteed through experience.
LTE is one of the most widely used mobile communication technologies and
is used by 262 operators in 120 countries, the number of which continues to
increase [5]. The earliest standard related to LTE1 was published in 2007, and
the first commercial network was launched in 2010 [14].
In 2013, 3GPP defined Public Safety LTE (PS-LTE) by adding the system
features of LTE, namely, a proximity-based service (ProSe) and group communi-
cation system enabler (GCSE). The standards of these features were included in
3GPP release 12 in 2015. One year later, in 3GPP release 13, additional PPDR
functions, including mission critical push-to-talk (MCPTT) and an isolated E-
UTRAN operation for public safety (IOPS), were applied.
PS-LTE networks are widely spreading as a communication mechanism for
PPDR in many countries. Figure 1 shows the global status of PS-LTE diffusion
as summarized in [2]2.
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Fig. 1. Global use of PS-LTE
Organizations using the PS-LTE infrastructure need to provide the services
run on their legacy network to the infrastructure to increase the effectiveness of
a PPDR operation. The services allow the organizations to continue facilitating
the information and system functionalities provided from the legacy network.
1 3GPP, TS 36.101 (ver.1.0.0): ”Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-
UTRA); User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception”
2 The status of the Republic of Korea updated from planned to developing compared
to the original source.
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A security threat analysis for the operation environment is necessarily pre-
ceded when designing a secure system linking architecture between the PS-LTE
infrastructure and the legacy networks. The protection mechanisms of most of
the analyzed threats should be reflected in the system architecture design. How-
ever, the security requirements of the system components against other threats
also need to be subtly tightened.
We extensively consider not only the operational environment but also the
overall system elements and provide the technical guidelines practically applica-
ble to organizations using the PS-LTE infrastructure.
2 Contribution
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: First, a
security model design framework is used to construct an environment adapting
to certain technologies for a specific purpose. In addition, we designed the sys-
tem architecture and security requirements for the user organization in PPDR
operational environment on PS-LTE infrastructure.
In the security model design framework section, we propose the general frame-
work used to design the security model by analyzing the security threats, building
the system architecture, and deriving the security requirements for the construc-
tion of an environment in which certain technologies are applied for a particular
purpose.
In the next section, we describe the application results of the proposed frame-
work used by PPDR organizations under the PS-LTE infrastructure. First, we
analyzed the characteristics of the operational environment from the aspect of
user organization on PS-LTE infrastructure. This analysis will help the user
organization raise situational awareness of their systems, applying PS-LTE in-
frastructure.
We constructed a baseline security level test-bed, as described later, and con-
ducted empirical studies of the security threats toward the test-bed environment.
Finally, we designed a secure system architecture to connect a legacy network to
a PS-LTE infrastructure while protecting the identified security threats. To fill
in the security gaps that the architecture cannot cover and tighten the security
level, we provide the security requirements of the system elements that must be
satisfied.
We want to mention that our empirical studies on the test-bed constructed
using the hardware used in the PS-LTE environment in the field may not be fully
generalized depending on the vendors and the system versions, the operational
environment, and so on. However, the security model design framework and
the application example can provide insight on how to enhance the security of
PS-LTE based PPDR operational environment.
The following section provides the preliminary technical background required
to understand this study.
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3 Technical Background
3.1 Basic Structure of LTE
The basic concept of the LTE system structure is described in [10] and schema-
tized in Figure 2. In the figure, the dotted and solid lines represent two logical
planes separated in an LTE network depending on the functionalities of the data;
the user and the control plane, respectively. The LTE network transfers the data
necessary to operate and maintain the network properly through the control
plane. The user plane is responsible for carrying data that users intentionally
generate (e.g., voice communication, SMS, application traffic) and sent over the
network.
The following subsections describe the key points of the components making
up the LTE structure.
HSS
MME
S-GW P-GW IP Network
PCRF
EPCE-UTRAN
UE
eNodeB
eNodeB
eNodeB
Fig. 2. Basic LTE system architecture
User Equipment (UE) UE includes cellular devices, such as cell phones and
tablets, interacting with base stations through radio signals. Several components
make up a UE and indicate its identity. Mobile Equipment (ME) includes mobile
terminals made by cell phone manufacturers.
A Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC), also known as a Universal Sub-
scriber Identity Module (USIM), is a smart card inserted into an ME. UICC
stores the cryptographic key used for the authentication and key agreement
(AKA) with the LTE network. UICC also contains a network ID, called a Pub-
lic Land Mobile Network (PLMN), from which the Mobile Network Operator
(MNO) of the UE obtains LTE service.
A UE has two permanent IDs assigned by the manufacturer and the MNO, an
International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI), and an International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (IMSI).
Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) An
UE transmits and receives a radio signal to/from the base stations, which is called
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Evolved Node B (eNodeB or eNB), to communicate with the core network. E-
UTRAN is a mesh network composed of eNodeBs that modulate and demodulate
radio signals.
Evolved Packet Core (EPC) EPC is the brain of an LTE network. It au-
thorizes UEs to connect to the network and manages their connections. The
following are the key components included within the EPC.
• Mobility Management Entity (MME): The primary entity treats sig-
nal plane data, including the functionalities that control AKA procedures
between UEs and Home Subscriber Server (HSS), and selects gateways that
route user plane data sent to/from the UEs.
• Home Subscriber Server (HSS): This stores the IDs and cryptographic
keys matched to the UE and generates an authentication vector for the AKA.
• Serving Gateway (S-GW): This carries user plane data and routes data
between the P-GW and E-UTRAN.
• Packet Data Network Gateway (P-GW): This allocates IP addresses
to the UEs, routes packets, and interconnects with the PDNs.
• IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS): This system provides multimedia ser-
vices such as VoLTE, SMS, and MMS.
• Policy and Charging Rules Function (PCRF): This stores rules and
policies related to the quality of service (QoS), charging, and allowed network
resources.
• Backhaul: This links E-UTRAN (eNodeBs) and EPC.
IP Network Any external IP network connected to an LTE network is called
a Packet Data Network (PDN). The P-GW routes the data from a PDN. The
gateway between the EPC and PDN is called an Access Point Name (APN),
which also serves as the identifier of the PDN. A UE must be assigned APNs to
connect to the PDNs.
3.2 PS-LTE Characteristics
PS-LTE provides additional features to support an effective PPDR operation
compared to a conventional LTE system. Group communication system enabler
(GCSE) is a fast and efficient mechanism to distribute various media content to
multiple users in a controlled manner. Proximity-based Services (ProSe) enable
direct and relayed communications among neighboring UEs without passing the
core network. IOPS provides the ability to maintain communications following
the loss of a backhaul connection. In addition, MCPTT supports enhanced PTT
services suitable for mission critical scenarios.
Table 1 lists above features and related 3GPP documents. The specifications
of the features can be found in the documents.
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Table 1. PS-LTE specific functionalities and corresponding 3GPP documents (TS,
technical specification; TR, technical report
Functionality Abbreviation
Requirements
(function/security)
Architecture
Security
issues
Group Communication
System Enablers
GCSE TS 22.468 TR 23.768 TS 33.888
Proximity-based Services ProSe
TS 22.803
TS 22.278
TR 23.703
TS 33.303
TS 33.833
TS 33.843
Isolated E-UTRAN Operation
for Public Security
IOPS
TS 22.346
TS 22.897
- TS 33.897
Mission Critical Push To Talk MCPTT
TS 22.179
TS 22.280
TR 23.779
TS 33.179
TS 33.879
TS 22.280
4 Related Studies
Researches into LTE security vulnerabilities help to understand security threats
on the proposed security model design framework. In [16], LTEInspector is pro-
posed, which analyzes the LTE system by leveraging the combined power of
a symbolic model checker and a protocol verifier through a model-based ad-
versarial testing approach. For three critical procedures of the 4G LTE protocol
(attach, paging, and detach), ten novel and nine known attacks were found using
LTEInspector.
In [28], the vulnerabilities of the RRC protocol are analyzed corresponding
to the layer two LTE protocol. The authors assumed two types of attack models,
passive and active. In their analysis, they found identity mapping and website
fingerprinting vulnerabilities under the passive attack model. In addition, a DNS
spoofing vulnerability was identified through the passive attack model. The au-
thors also demonstrated the feasibility of all three attacks using realistic setups.
In [19], a semi-automated testing tool, LTEFuzz, is implemented, which is a
dynamic testing tool targeting the control plane procedures of an LTE network.
The authors identified 15 known and 36 new vulnerabilities among different
commercial LTE networks and device vendors. They also demonstrated several
attacks based on the vulnerabilities. The attacks caused a denial of service,
phishing messages, and eavesdropping/manipulation of the data traffic.
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of the approaches in [16,19,28].
In [25], the researchers survey a number of new security threats to cause
unexpected service interruption and disclosure of information in 4G. They also
found there still remain several open issues although many are working on fix-
ing and/or designing new security architectures for 4G. This helps us to build
security model design.
There are security threats on LTE system in [12, 22, 23]. These works are
relevant to our security threat analysis on 6.6. We analyze the security threats
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Table 2. Studies on LTE protocol security
LTEInspector [16] LTE Layer 2
Vul. [28]
LTEFuzz [19]
analysis target
protocol
NAS (attach,
paging, detach)
MAC and PDCP RRC and NAS
approach - model based
adversarial
approach
- manual analysis - semi-automatic
fuzzing
pre-requisite
- adversarial model
construction
[fingerprinting
attack] websites
metadata
acquisition
- building pack DB
for fuzzing
security property
definition
[aLTEr attack]
deleting victim’s
DNS and http cache
- targeting TMSI
acquisition
cons
manually prepare
the prerequisites
- proposing the
results in
experimental
environment
- no protocol
interaction for
fuzzing
- [fingerprinting
attack] low website
coverage
- generated fuzzing
message simply by
packet field
mutation- [aLTEr attack]
unrealistic
pre-requisite
on PPDR operational environment and build system architecture preventing
security threats.
In [23], attacks toward an LTE system are classified into four groups: 1)
attacks against security and confidentiality such as Evolved Packet System Au-
thentication and Key Agreement(EPS-AKA) security issues or a management
handover key failure, 2) IP-based attacks against a backhaul, GPRS Tunneling
Protocol(GTP), voice over LTE(VoLTE) Session Initiation Protocol(SIP), and
diameter, 3) attacks on the signal plane and 4) jamming attacks on the physical
layer.
In [12], the researchers survey existing authentication and privacy-preserving
schemes. They present four threat models classified into privacy, integrity, avail-
ability, and authentication, three countermeasures classified into cryptography
methods, humans factors, and intrusion detection methods. They provide a tax-
onomy and comparison of authentication and privacy-preserving schemes for 4G
and 5G cellular networks in the form of tables.
The LTE security threats against jamming, spoofing, and sniffing at physical
channels are researched in [22]. The researchers measured each LTE jamming
8 D. Kim et al.
attack’s complexity and efficiency and identified which channel/signal is the
weakest. Due to LTE is not designed to become a mission-critical communication
technology, it is highly vulnerable to jamming attacks.
The IMSI-catchers, also known as cell-site simulators or stingrays, are threats
to LTE system subscribers. They act as rogue base stations that can track cell-
phone locations and often eavesdrop on cellular communications. The works for
catching IMSI-catchers help us to analyze threats against rogue base stations.
In [11], there are two implementations of an IMSI Catcher Catcher(ICC).
IMSI Catchers identify and eavesdrop on phones in mobile networks, and ICC
detects this threat. They implemented ICC with stationary measurement units
and app for standard consumer grade mobile phones.
In [24], Seaglass is a city-wide cell-site simulator detector. Seaglass is ca-
pable of detecting anomalies across a wide variety of signature classes, poten-
tially caused by actual cell-site simulators. This may be needed to PPDR op-
erational environment preventing from city-wide tracking and eavesdropping on
cell phones.
The other proposal for enhancing subscribers’ security is using multiple IMSIs
for a mobile telephony subscriber. The proposed schemes in [17] provide a form
of pseudonymity on the air interface, even when it is necessary to send the IMSI
in cleartext. The schemes reduce the impact of user privacy threats arising from
IMSI capture.
Although the system is designed to be secure, threats maybe still existing.
The existing errors in implementation or configuration generate threats to LTE
system. The LTE specification must be implemented accurately in PPDR oper-
ational environment.
In [9], four misconfigured networks and multiple cases of implementation
issues are existing in commercial networks. The researchers analyze the security
configuration and test the security algorithm selection in a total of twelve LTE
networks in five European countries.
According to [30], several modern smartphones are not implemented with the
LTE specification. They do not inform the user that even the user data is sent
unencrypted. The researchers present Man-in-the-Middle(MitM) attack against
an LTE device that does not fulfill the network authentication requirements.
The srsLTE, in [13], is an open-source platform for LTE experimentation,
designed for maximum modularity and code reuse and fully compliant with LTE
Release 8. It is applicable to experimental LTE test-bed platforms and test-
ing LTE configuration or implementation. It can be used as either UE or base
stations with software-defined radio (SDR) device. This implementation helps
us to understanding attacks by UEs(6.3) like type 2 and type3 or rogue base
station(6.3) in our research.
In [15], among 28 carriers, 19 carriers have easily predictable and consistent
patterns in GUTI reallocation mechanisms. Revisiting 4 carriers, they also have
predictable patterns after invoking GUTI reallocation multiple times within a
short time period. By using this predictability, the adversary can track sub-
scribers’ locations.
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Early VoLTE implementations contain several vulnerabilities that lead to se-
rious exploits, such as caller spoofing, over-billing, and denial-of-service attacks.
VoLTE is also used in mission-critical-push-to-talk(MCPTT), which is one of
functionality in PS-LTE. [18] and [20] are dealing with these vulnerabilities in
VoLTE.
Unlike the traditional call setup, the VoLTE call setup is controlled and
performed at the Application Processor(AP), using the SIP over IP. A legitimate
user who has control over the AP can potentially control and exploit the call
setup process to establish a VoLTE. In [18], the researchers identified a number
of vulnerabilities of early VoLTE and proposed immediate countermeasures that
can be employed to alleviate the problems but the more comprehensive solution
that eliminates the root causes may be needed.
In [20], several vulnerabilities exist in both control-plane and data-plane func-
tions that can be exploited to disrupt both data and voice in operational net-
works. The proof of concept attacks are validated using commodity smartphones
in two Tier-I US mobile carriers. It is possible that these vulnerabilities also exist
in smartphones used in PS-LTE system.
Four root causes for attacks in the current mobile network(2G, 3G, and 4G)
are analyzed in [29]: wireless channel, protocol context discrepancy, an implemen-
tation issue, and specification issue. The researchers categorize known attacks
by their aim, proposed defenses, underlying cases, and root causes. This paper
classifies threats into root causes compared to our paper.
The authentication and key agreement(AKA) algorithm used in LTE system
has several vulnerabilities. [21, 33] are researches about identified vulnerabili-
ties of AKA and improved authentication algorithm. These are needed for our
security requirements to UE and PS-LTE infrastructure(6.7).
In [21], Evolved Packet System Authentication and Key Agreement (EPS
AKA) procedure is used to provide mutual authentication between the user
and the network in the LTE/SAE architecture has several vulnerabilities such
as disclosure of user identity, man-in-the-middle attack. The proposed Security
Enhanced EPS AKA(SE-EPS AKA) can satisfy the security and efficiency prop-
erties in the LTE/SAE architecture.
In [33], the lack of identity protection at the first initial attaches and the
lack of perfect forward secrecy for the AKA mechanism are access-level security
issues that may arise at the eNodeB, UE and MME level. The proposed usage of
Password-Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling(J-PAKE) protocol instead
of AKA protocol suited for use in the mobile device environment.
We analyze security threats and design the system architecture(6.7), enhanc-
ing security. The researches about security requirements and LTE security en-
hancement helps us to propose system security requirements in detail.
In [27], eight main Security Requirement Engineering(SRE) activities are
proposed for Cyber-Physical System(CPS). The purpose of these activities is to
identify security requirements in a heterogeneous CPS system. In the case study
of smart car parking systems, 40 security requirements are elicited following their
activities. Compared to our research, this work just focused on the efficiency of
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the SRE framework. The researchers identified security threats and assessed the
risks of a car parking system to evaluate eight SRE frameworks.
In [26], the proposed Security Improvement Framework(SIF) can predict and
protect various potential malicious attacks in the Zigbee network and respond
accordingly through a notification to the system administrator. The designed
SIF has been implemented in an office security system as a case study for real-
time monitoring. The evaluation results show the capacity for detecting and
protecting several potential security attacks. The researchers have categorized
attacks by key requirements and network layers. There are some limitations to
applying this methodology to our works because our study’s target system is
more complicated than the Zigbee network.
5 Security Model Design Framework
Some systems can be used in ways that were not intended when developed. In
addition, some technologies are adopted to implement environments that are not
intended to be developed. In either case, the security model should be properly
designed for modified environments.
To overcome this issue, we propose a practical framework for the security
model design for a particular application environment, as shown in Figure 3. The
framework enables the design of the security model for the system composed of
the components developed as heterogeneous purposes.
full
application 
environment
out of 
analysis scope
analysis
scope
system
architecture
analysis 
scope
reduction
protection
by architecture
protection
by specification
specification
enforcing to the application environment
accepted risks
security
requirements
enforced
requirements
assumptions
Security
objectives
security
threats
security
threat
analysis
① ③
②
④
⑤
Fig. 3. Security model design framework
To reduce the scope of a security threat analysis ( 1©), our framework applies
certain assumptions based on the application environment and the actual restric-
tions. If necessary, some of the assumptions can be satisfied by enforcing them
as the security requirements ( 2©). The threats neither within the analysis scope
nor covered by the assumptions are accepted risks. Following a security analysis
for a reduced analysis ( 3©), some of the threats are protected by modifying the
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system architecture ( 4©), and others by specifying the security requirements of
the system ( 5©).
In this framework, one can adopt any available security threat modeling
methods, including those introduced in [31]. If the method requires the data
flow diagram (DFD) as an input, the coverage of the DFD should be restricted
by applying the analysis scope.
The goal of the security model design framework is to improve the security of
a system. Some of the threat modeling methods also provide a guide to discover
security control that effectively removes, counter, or mitigate all relevant vulner-
abilities. For example, PASTA [32] includes the countermeasure indication pro-
cess. Since PASTA focuses on the software security aspect, the countermeasures
are derived as the form of additional the security functions. LINDUN [34] deals
with security problems as the privacy aspect. In the mitigation strategy elicita-
tion step of LINDDUN method, the privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) are
provided to obtain privacy. OCTAVE [8] has the step to select the protection
strategy among accepting, mitigate, and defer as introduced in ISO 20071. These
threat modeling methods provide conceptional mitigation strategies, techniques,
and functionalities. Compared with these threat model methods, our security
model design framework specifies the mitigation strategy to the system archi-
tecture modification and the security requirements specification, which includes
additional functionalities and software modifications. Therefore, this framework
helps to understand how to reflect the mitigation strategy to the system.
The framework can be clarified through the application demonstrated in the
following section. As aforementioned, the mitigated strategy toward the security
threats belonging to Table 3 against the initial system in Figure 5 are specified
to the improved system structure in Figure 6 and to the system requirements in
Table 7.
6 Application to the PPDR Operational Environment
under PS-LTE Infrastructure
Before the scope restriction step, the operational environment characteristics
from the user organization aspect of the PS-LTE infrastructure need to be ana-
lyzed to support the situation awareness.
6.1 Analysis of Operational Environment
PS-LTE is a network infrastructure allowing the PPDR organizations to com-
municate and share information regarding an operation. To conduct security
threat analysis and derive proper security requirements, it is crucial to under-
stand the operational environment through which several organizations share
infrastructure and connect their legacy systems.
Figure 4 demonstrates the characteristics of the PPDR operational environ-
ment based on the PS-LTE infrastructure.
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(⬌: device connection / ⬌: network connection) ComponentCharacteristics
common
services 
network
Fig. 4. PPDR operational environment characteristics based on the PS-LTE
The components consisting of the operational environment can be catego-
rized into UEs, LTE infrastructure, and IP networks. Individual users utilize the
UEs owned by their organizations, and the device information is registered in
LTE infrastructure, specifically in the HSS. All personnel conduct operations
using their UEs under a shared LTE infrastructure (eNodeBs and EPC), and
services (e.g., VoLTE, SMS, and MCPTT) are managed and controlled by an-
other authority. Legacy IP networks can be connected to the LTE infrastructure
to provide unique services required for each organization.
In terms of the connection characteristics, UEs can communicate not only
with UEs under the same organization but also with those under different or-
ganizations. The connected legacy IP networks are reachable from all registered
UEs even when they belong to different organizations.
These characteristics invoke environment-specific vulnerabilities, which must
be prevented using features primarily provided by the LTE system.
6.2 Assumptions
Two assumptions and their effects on the analysis are described below.
A1. PPDR organizations are unable to affect a PS-LTE system. The
requirements of the PS-LTE system are defined in the standards, as summarized
in Table 1. Because PS-LTE is based on the LTE system, more standards exist
to define a plain LTE system. Although several vulnerabilities caused by the
standard issues have been reported [19], PPDR organizations are typically not
the stakeholders resolving such issues.
By this assumption, we exclude the LTE and PS-LTE standards from our
research scope.
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A2. Security of the shared infrastructure and services are provided
by the host organization. The authority and responsibility to maintain and
control the shared infrastructure and common services, as shown in Figure 4, are
typically established for an organization. Security requirements of the infrastruc-
ture and services should be applied and verified during the system construction.
In addition, they should be monitored by the organization. The PPDR organi-
zations need to trust the security status maintained by the host organization.
Based on this assumption, we consider the threats to the UEs and the IP
network connectivity inside attackers authorized to connect to the EPC and
rough eNodeBs that are not linked to the infrastructure.
6.3 Analysis Scope Reduction
We categorized the types of security threats within the research scope considered
in this study. To analyze the security threats and conduct empirical studies on
them, we also designed and built a test-bed. The threat categories and test-bed
structure are graphically shown in Figure 5.
HSS
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eNodeB
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Fig. 5. Categories of security threats and test-bed structure applied baseline security
Category 1. UE UEs are sub-categorized into three types depending on their
authorization to use the infrastructure and entities. A type 1 UE is owned by
the same organization operating the linked entities and is able to obtain services
provided by these entities. Thus, a type 1 UE is authorized to use the infrastruc-
ture and linked entities. A type 2 UE is owned by other organizations using a
shared infrastructure. This type of UE can use the infrastructure but should be
prohibited from using the linked entities. A type 3 UE is not even authorized to
use the infrastructure regardless of having the transmission ability of the same
physical radio frequency as type 1 and 2 UEs.
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Each type of UE comprises a security threat. Type 1 UEs can be misused
(1.1), and type 2 and 3 UEs can threaten type 1 UEs (1.2 and 1.3). Furthermore,
all types of UEs can have an adversarial effect on the connected entities (1.4).
Category 2. eNodeB Assumption A1 excludes eNodeBs belonging to a shared
infrastructure from this research. However, eNodeBs that are not connected to
the infrastructure for an adversarial intention still threaten type 1 UEs by re-
sulting in an unintended connection (2.1).
Category 3. EPC Based on assumption A2, the threats through an EPC are
monitored, although it is difficult to monitor those originating from the EPC.
We consider the threats by an insider attack (3.1) from the EPC side to the
IP networks and HSSA, which is operated by the user organization and set as
baseline security. The reason for this is described later.
Category 4. IP network We apply a virtual private network (VPN) gateway
and an external app server in the baseline security of an IP network, the reasons
for which are described later. We also derive the threats that can bypass the
baseline security (4.1 and 4.2).
Table 3 summarizes the categories of security threats within this research scope.
Table 3. Categories of security threats within the research scope
No. Category Label Explanation
1 UE
1.1 Threats of type 1 UEs
1.2 Threats from type 2 to type 1 UEs and to linked IP networks
1.3 Threats from type 3 to type 1 UEs and to linked IP networks
2 eNodeB 2.1 Threats from rogue eNodeBs
3 EPC 3.1 Threats caused by insider attack from EPC
4 IP network
4.1 Threats bypassing the transfer ciphering (VPN gateway)
4.2 Threats from external app server
6.4 Test-bed structure
To conduct an empirical study and analyze the security threats, we constructed
a test environment applying HSSA connected to an EPC controlled by the user
organization, a VPN gateway, and an external app server as the baseline security
elements, as shown in Figure 5. These are selected to make critical data con-
trollable by the organization and protect the processes and data flow originating
from the organization in terms of threat modeling [6].
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The HSS stores the cryptographic keys matched to the UEs. These keys are
essential to protect the UEs and the network because they are used for mutual
authentication between the UEs and the LTE network. The user organization
needs to be able to control and protect such data even from the operating au-
thority of the shared infrastructure. For this objective, HSSA independent from
HSS belonging to the shared infrastructure is added to the entities of the user
organization. Because the authentication vector, which is generated using the
keys and sent to the MME from the HSS for mutual authentication, does not
contain the keys [4] [10], the objective can be achieved through this baseline
security. A subscriber location function (SLF) is required to operate more than
two HSSs by selecting the HSS used for the authentication [3].
The LTE network provides confidentiality and an integrity protection mecha-
nism for control and user plane data. However, the application of the confidential-
ity protection of both planes remains an option of the network operator [4] [10].
To protect the data flow originating from the user organization’s IP networks,
the VPN gateway is required to encrypt the user plane communication channel
between the UEs and IP networks regardless of the operating authority. We used
SSL VPN, which works on the application layer.
The last baseline security element is the external app server. The user orga-
nization’s internal web server providing the PPDR services is one of the assets
belonging to the organization’s legacy network where critical data are saved and
transmitted. Although the radio frequency band is physically separated from
that of a commercial network, it is risky to allow the UEs to connect to the web
server directly. The app server is located between the web server and the UEs
and operates as a proxy in the demilitarized zone (DMZ), which transmits traffic
from the UEs to the web server in the proper format. We also implemented the
service policy function in the web server, controlling the services to be provided
to the app server. Through this mechanism, UEs allow only permitted services
based on policy among the services running on the web server.
6.5 Security Objectives
In Table 4, we list the general security objectives for the data and assets of the
PPDR service environment linked to PS-LTE.
Table 4. Security objective of the PPDR service system environment linked to PS-LTE
No. Security objectives
1 Confidentiality, availability, and integrity of data between the user organization
and its UEs should be protected.
2 Unauthorized access to the assets of the user organization should be denied.
Based on the first assumption described above, we only set the confidentiality,
availability, and integrity protection of the user plane data between the organi-
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zation and the owned UEs as the first security objective. The second objective
defines the denials of access that are unnecessary to provide and maintain LTE
and PPDR services.
6.6 Security Threat Analysis
For each security threat category listed in Table 3, we have drawn several poten-
tial threats. The numbers of threats and their examples are provided in Table 5.3
Compared to [7] and [1], which document security threats applicable to a general
LTE and mobile environment, our threats mostly target the specific operational
environment described earlier.
Table 5. Numbers and examples of security threats in each category
Category Label Count Threat example
UE
1.1 35 device level information disclosure of type 1 UE; external
data network connection of type 1 UE and the following
threats.
1.2 7 sending malicious attachments from type 2 to type 1 UE;
other device connections to linked IP network through
type 2 UE.
1.3 6 network level information disclosure of type 1 UE and
the following spoofing threats.
eNodeB 2.1 11 external network connection of type 1 UE and the follow-
ing information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation
of privilege threats.
EPC 3.1 15 accessing HSSA and IP network by protocol not specified
in standards; information disclosure of user plane data.
IP
network
4.1 7 VPN client identification spoofing; encrypted user plane
data replay.
4.2 3 denial of service and elevation of privilege of the services
running on web server.
Total number 84
Table 6 shows the statistics of the impart for each threat category. We as-
sumed that the priority of system security is in order of integrity, confidentiality,
and availability. In terms of confidentiality of data, the plain text data in or-
der of the deciphered user data and the system configuration data is important
than the ciphered data. Therefore, we defined the categories of the threats im-
pact crucial, high, medium, and low, where definitions of each are described in
Table 6.
3 We leave out to list all threats due to the page limit and the security policy.
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It is worth noting that over 90% of the threats belonging to the EPC category
show crucial or high impact. Since all user and system data between UE and
IP network, including cipher setting information transferred through S-GW and
P-GW, the threats in this category cause the most significant impacts.
Table 6. The impact of the threats by the threat categories
Definition UE eNodeB EPC IP Network
Crucial the system integrity damage
10
(21%)
2
(18.2%)
2
(26.7%)
-
High
the confidentiality damage
(deciphered data leakage)
10
(21%)
2
(18.2%)
10
(66.7%)
5
(50%)
Medium
the confidentiality damage
(system configuration data leakage)
24
(50%)
-
1
(6.6%)
3
(30%)
Low
the confidentiality damage
(ciphered data leakage)
the availability damage
4
(8%)
7
(63.6%)
2
(20%)
-
6.7 System Architecture and Security Requirements
To prevent the analyzed security threats at the architecture level, we designed
the system architecture (Figure 6) by enhancing the security features of our
test-bed structure (Figure 5).
HSSA
App server
(External)
Web server
(Internal)
AV MDM Monitoring
system
APN 
firewall
LTE 
firewall
DMZ 
firewall
HSS
MME
S-GW P-GW
PCRF
PS-LTE EPC
SLF
Legacy PPDR service system network 
connection architecture
. . .
S-GWA P-GWA
security
systems
Fig. 6. System architecture preventing security threats in the operation environment
The necessities of each entity except for those described in section 6.4 are as
follows.
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• S/P-GWA: allocates IP to UEs within distinguishable range and protects
from a sniffing of the user data
• LTE firewall: enforces LTE signaling data transferred only between compo-
nents through protocols defined in the specifications
• APN firewall: protects IP network from unallowed external access and LTE
components from unallowed internal access
• DMZ firewall: allows network access only to legitimate app-web server pairs
and certain services/protocols
• Security systems: enforce security policies to UEs
• Monitoring system: watches for prohibited or abnormal network access
The specifications of the security requirements used to protect from the
threats, categorized as UEs, infrastructure, and the service system, are listed
in Table 7. The UE category includes the requirements directly implemented in
and applied to the UEs through security systems. The infrastructure category
covers EPC, S/P-GWA, LTE, APN firewalls, and a transfer cipher function
(VPN). The service system category corresponds to apps and web servers, as
well as a DMZ firewall.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
To design a security model in a PPDR operation environment under the PS-
LTE infrastructure, we first introduced a framework for designing the security
model for the environment under which the technologies are adopted for a spe-
cific purpose. In addition, we demonstrated the application results in the target
environment. As a result, the system architecture and the security requirements
for the system are designed as the security model.
The main observation in the framework application example in section 6 is
that even the cryptographic setting information can be sniffed from the S-GW
and the P-GW. For a reason, we proposed constructing the S-GW and the P-
GW that are owned by the user organization. However, the security objective can
also be achieved by using IPSec VPN, which works on the network layer. Since
IPSec VPN supports the symmetric cipher, the cryptographic key exchange is
not required.
During the proposed framework application under the PPDR operational en-
vironment, the PS-LTE technologies defined in standards such as GCSE, ProSe,
and IOPS are excluded from the analysis based on certain assumptions. However,
these technologies may cause security threats, which have yet to be researched.
We would like to extend this analysis’s scope to increase the security of the
PPDR operational environment.
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Table 7. Security requirements
Category Security requirements
UE
- restrict to only access the LTE network (PLMN4) that the shared
infrastructure (PS-LTE) operates
- prohibit from accessing other IP networks except those operated by
the owner organization
- restrict not to provide network functionalities that enable other de-
vices to access the IP networks, e.g., hotspot and tethering
- protect external storages to be read
- apply data leakage protection, e.g., use data store ciphering or build
a cloud system to prohibit UE from storing data
- enforce memory protection and apply PIN to USIM
- enforce user to UE authentication
- allow to transceive only the PS-LTE radio frequency bands (enforced
requirement)
- enable minimum functionality of UE when network is disconnected or
the mobile device management (security) policies are not applicable
- allow only the mobile service application to be installed in the white
list
- enforce encryption/decryption of all data tranceived from/to UE
- enforce the security policies to be applied after the factory initializa-
tion of UE
- protect the mobile applications to enforce security policies to be ter-
minated and removed
- keep the versions of OS and the mobile applications installed in UE
up to date and confirm the integrity of the update files
- prohibit to execute all functionalities of rooted UEs
PS-LTE
infrastructure
- enforce multi-factor authentication for user to UE, user to infrastruc-
ture (network), and user to services authentications
- check validity of IMSI and IMEI pair and user and UE pair during
network connection
- allow connections between LTE components only specified in stan-
dards and restrict the connections to service/protocol level
- allow UE connection to IP network only to those allocated IP within
distinguishable range
- continuously change ciphering keys for transferring data even within
the same session
- enforce the traffic tranceived between type 1 UE and IP network of
an organization to pass P-GWA and S-GWA, not P-GW nor S-GW
- allocate IP address to type 1 UEs distinct to other UEs
- use security certified devices consisting the security systems
PPDR service
system
- provide API to call functions in web server and defines/sets autho-
rization levels considering user types
- prohibit from executing the functions for which the API is not defined
-provide services run in web server to UEs only through app server
- do not store any generated or passing data to app server during service;
app server behaves like a proxy
- develop the mobile service applications as in-app fashion and check if
requests sent from UE generated by the applications; apps must not
rely on browser
- develop mobile service applications applying obfuscation technologies
- develop the app/web server programs and the mobile service applica-
tions following the secure coding norms
- use security certified devices consisting the security systems
20 D. Kim et al.
References
1. Study on mobile device security. Tech. rep., U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(April 2017)
2. Public safety LTE networks: State of the market and device ecosystem. GSA report,
Global mobile Suppliers Association (July 2018)
3. 3GPP TS 23.228: IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); stage 2. Technical specification,
3rd Generation Partnership Project (September 2019)
4. 3GPP TS 33.401: 3GPP System Architecture Evolution (SAE); security archi-
tecture. Technical specification, 3rd Generation Partnership Project (September
2019)
5. VoLTE and ViLTE: Global market update. GSA report, Global mobile Suppliers
Association (August 2019)
6. Abi-Antoun, M., Wang, D., Torr, P.: Checking threat modeling data flow dia-
grams for implementation conformance and security. pp. 393–396 (January 2007).
https://doi.org/10.1145/1321631.1321692
7. Brown, C., Dog, S., Franklin, J.M., McNab, N., Voss-Northrop, S., Peck, M., Stid-
ham, B.: Draft NISTIR 8144: Assessing threats to mobile devices & infrastructure;
the mobile threat catalogue. Tech. rep., National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (September 2016)
8. Caralli, R.A., Stevens, J.F., Young, L.R., Wilson, W.R.: Introducing octave allegro:
Improving the information security risk assessment process. Tech. rep., Carnegie-
Mellon Univ Pittsburgh PA Software Engineering Inst (2007)
9. Chlosta, M., Rupprecht, D., Holz, T., Po¨pper, C.: Lte security disabled:
Misconfiguration in commercial networks. In: Proceedings of the 12th Con-
ference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. p.
261266. WiSec 19, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY,
USA (2019). https://doi.org/10.1145/3317549.3324927, https://doi.org/10.
1145/3317549.3324927
10. Cichonski, J., Franklin, J.M., Bartock, M.: NIST Special Publication 800-187
Guide to LTE Security. Tech. rep., National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) (2018). https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-187
11. Dabrowski, A., Pianta, N., Klepp, T., Mulazzani, M., Weippl, E.: Imsi-catch me
if you can: Imsi-catcher-catchers. In: Proceedings of the 30th annual computer
security applications Conference. pp. 246–255 (2014)
12. Ferrag, M.A., Maglaras, L., Argyriou, A., Kosmanos, D., Janicke, H.: Security
for 4g and 5g cellular networks: A survey of existing authentication and privacy-
preserving schemes. Journal of Network and Computer Applications 101 (11 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2017.10.017
13. Gomez-Miguelez, I., Garcia-Saavedra, A., Sutton, P.D., Serrano, P., Cano, C.,
Leith, D.J.: srslte: an open-source platform for lte evolution and experimentation.
In: Proceedings of the Tenth ACM International Workshop on Wireless Network
Testbeds, Experimental Evaluation, and Characterization. pp. 25–32 (2016)
14. Gozalvez, J.: First commercial LTE network. IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine
5(2), 8–16 (June 2010). https://doi.org/10.1109/MVT.2010.936656
15. Hong, B., Bae, S., Kim, Y.: Guti reallocation demystified: Cellular location tracking
with changing temporary identifier. In: Network and Distributed Systems Security
(NDSS) Symposium (2018)
4 Public Land Mobile Network
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 21
16. Hussain, S.R., Chowdhury, O., Mehnaz, S., Bertino, E.: LTEInspector: A System-
atic Approach for Adversarial Testing of 4G LTE. In: Network and Distributed
Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium (Feburary 2018)
17. Khan, M.S.A., Mitchell, C.J.: Improving air interface user privacy in mobile tele-
phony. In: International Conference on Research in Security Standardisation. pp.
165–184. Springer (2015)
18. Kim, H., Kim, D., Kwon, M., Han, H., Jang, Y., Han, D., Kim, T., Kim, Y.: Break-
ing and fixing volte: Exploiting hidden data channels and mis-implementations. In:
Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security. pp. 328–339 (2015)
19. Kim, H., Lee, J., Lee, E., Kim, Y.: Touching the Untouchables: Dynamic Security
Analysis of the LTE Control Plane. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on
Security & Privacy (SP) (2019)
20. Li, C.Y., Tu, G.H., Peng, C., Yuan, Z., Li, Y., Lu, S., Wang, X.: In-
security of voice solution volte in lte mobile networks. In: Proceedings of
the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Se-
curity. p. 316327. CCS 15, Association for Computing Machinery, New York,
NY, USA (2015). https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813618, https://doi.org/
10.1145/2810103.2813618
21. Li, X., Wang, Y.: Security enhanced authentication and key agreement protocol
for lte/sae network. In: 2011 7th International Conference on Wireless Communi-
cations, Networking and Mobile Computing. pp. 1–4. IEEE (2011)
22. Lichtman, M., Jover, R.P., Labib, M., Rao, R., Marojevic, V., Reed, J.H.: Lte/lte-a
jamming, spoofing, and sniffing: threat assessment and mitigation. IEEE Commu-
nications Magazine 54(4), 54–61 (2016)
23. Mavoungou, S., Kaddoum, G., Taha, M., Matar, G.: Survey on threats
and attacks on mobile networks. IEEE Access 4, 4543–4572 (2016).
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2016.2601009
24. Ney, P., Smith, I., Cadamuro, G., Kohno, T.: Seaglass: Enabling city-wide imsi-
catcher detection. Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2017 (07 2017).
https://doi.org/10.1515/popets-2017-0027
25. Park, Y., Park, T.: A survey of security threats on 4g net-
works. In: 2007 IEEE Globecom Workshops. pp. 1–6 (Nov 2007).
https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOCOMW.2007.4437813
26. Rana, S., Halim, M.A., Kabir, M.H.: Design and implementation of a security im-
provement framework of zigbee network for intelligent monitoring in iot platform.
Applied Sciences 8(11), 2305 (2018)
27. Rehman, S.U., Gruhn, V.: An effective security requirements engineer-
ing framework for cyber-physical systems. Technologies 6, 65 (07 2018).
https://doi.org/10.3390/technologies6030065
28. Rupprecht, D., Kohls, K., Holz, T., Ppper, C.: Breaking LTE on Layer Two.
In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). pp. 1121–1136 (May 2019).
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2019.00006
29. Rupprecht, D., Dabrowski, A., Holz, T., Weippl, E., Ppper, C.: On security re-
search towards future mobile network generations. IEEE Communications Surveys
& Tutorials (10 2017). https://doi.org/10.1109/COMST.2018.2820728
30. Rupprecht, D., Jansen, K., Po¨pper, C.: Putting lte security functions to the test: A
framework to evaluate implementation correctness. In: 10th USENIX Workshop
on Offensive Technologies (WOOT 16) (2016)
22 D. Kim et al.
31. Shevchenko, N., Chick, T.A., O’Riordan, P., Scanlon, T.P., Woody, C.: Threat
modeling: a summary of available methods. Tech. rep., Carnegie Mellon University
Software Engineering Institute Pittsburgh United States (2018)
32. UcedaVelez, T., Morana, M.M.: Risk centric threat modeling. Wiley Online Library
(2015)
33. Vintila˘, C.E., Patriciu, V.V., Bica, I.: Security analysis of lte access network. In:
Proc. 10th Intl Conf. Networks. pp. 29–34 (2011)
34. Wuyts, K., Joosen, W.: Linddun privacy threat modeling: a tutorial. CW Reports
(2015)
